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Introduction
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis that started in 2007, bankers' compensation has become a major issue both for banks' corporate governance and regulation. The main question is whether large short-term bonuses spurred too much risk-taking that partly caused the crisis. For instance, Rajan (2005) , who foresaw some of the key developments that eventually led to the crisis, emphasizes the role of short-term compensation. In response to the compensation concerns, both regulators and banks themselves have started to take restrictive measures on compensation.
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In this paper we revisit the question whether the new regulatory initiatives to restrict the size and term of bankers' pay are justified on the basis of excessive risk-taking incentives, induced by short-term bonuses. We derive the theoretical value of a banker's expected future bonus stream, and measure the banker's risk-taking incentive by the derivative of the present value of the bonuses with respect to the bank's levered earnings volatility. Thus, we measure the banker's incentive to increase risk and the risk-taking is done by raising leverage or by buying riskier assets. Due to the option-like nature of bonuses, bonuses are only paid out of positive profits and the value of future bonuses is convex with respect to the profits. Therefore, the present value of future bonuses is a series of sequential call options on the bank's levered earnings (i.e., the profits). In other words, we use the standard continuous-time asset pricing framework to model the value of the future bonus stream to a banker, and to derive the banker's risk-taking incentives within that framework.
We obtain two key theoretical results with the model. First, we show that the series of bonuses is worth the more, the shorter is the time interval between bonus determination points. Intuitively, we may compare this result with Merton (1973) who shows that a portfolio of options on individual stocks is worth more than an option on the basket consisting of those stocks. However, in our case this analysis is over the duration of bonus options, not over stocks in a portfolio. Our theoretical result suggests that bankers (and similarly, e.g., hedge fund and private equity managers) have a strong incentive to negotiate themselves compensation contracts with short payment horizons.
2 Second, we show that the shorter the bonus determination interval is, the higher the banker's risk-taking incentive in terms of increasing the levered earnings volatility. 3 Although our model does not generate any predictions as to how the terms of a banker's compensation contract are determined, this result is important because it formalizes the common notion that short-term bonus contracts spur risk-taking. ante. In addition, we test whether the model risk-taking incentive, which is a non-linear function of four elements [1) CEO bonus over net income, 2) CEO's expected tenure,
3) volatility of levered earnings, and 4) book equity], adds value over its elements and other control variables in explaining the crisis returns.
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Our empirical results suggest that regulating leverage would be more effective than regulating bankers' compensation. More specifically, we first find that our model risk- 2 In the hedge fund industry, the effect on risk-taking incentives of short payment horizons can be controlled by the so called high-water marks (see e.g. Panageas and Westerfield (2009) ). 3 We show that also the expected tenure matters. The time interval between standard bonuses is one year, and this is what we also use in the empirical part. Our theoretical result may be suggestive of the incentive effects of other forms of convex compensation such as executive options in which vesting periods are typically longer than one year. In case of executive options the underlying asset is the bank's stock price, not the bank's profit. Therefore, the current model is not directly applicable to option grants but, assuming that earnings and stock prices are highly correlated, the model can be used as an approximation for option grants (for instance, Durre and Giot (2005) find a significant long-run relationship between stock indexes and earnings). 4 See e.g. Edmans et al. (2011) for a model which derives the optimal level and performancesensitivity of CEO compensation contract. Short-term bonus contracts and their effects are also commonly discussed in financial press (see e.g. Bloomberg, 19 June 2013, U.K. Banker Bonuses Face Decade Delays in Industry Overhaul). 5 Note that each of the elements (1-4) could alone predict bank crisis return. CEO bonus per net income is a similar risk-taking incentive measure as the one used by Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) . Volatility of levered earnings (i.e. profits) is a measure of bank riskiness, and book equity may proxy for bank size which could be related to high risk-taking via the bank taking advantage of the implicit public guarantee allegedly enjoyed by too-big-to-fail banks. CEO's expected tenure may also be related to risk-taking but in principle the direction of the relationship could go either way. However, by our model and empirical results with banks' z-score data (Table 6 ), tenure raises risk-taking as that implies a greater number of future bonus options.
taking incentive is negatively related to crisis returns and significant but explains only about 3% of the variation of the crisis returns in the bank sample. Second, the model risk-taking incentive is no longer significant if its four elements are added as control variables. When we add further control variables we find that two of them, market to book value of equity and bank leverage, have a robust relationship with the crisis returns. Banks with higher market to book ratios did relatively better during the crisis and highly leveraged banks did relatively poorly. Together these two variables explain about 17% of the crisis return variation in the sample, leverage being the more important driver. Interestingly, we find that banks which increased their leverage during the last Therefore, our results support the view that regulating leverage would be more effective than regulating bonuses.
More than two thirds (61) of the 86 sample banks actually paid zero bonuses at the end of 2006. The relationship between our model risk-taking incentive and crisis return is much stronger among the 25 banks that paid positive bonuses, but the relationship is not robust with respect to the set of control variables. The few banks with extremely large risk-taking incentives based on our model did have relatively poor stock performance during the crisis, but there were also plenty of banks who paid zero bonuses before the crisis and still did quite badly during the crisis. With a subsample of 51 banks that have granted CEO options we also test the risk-taking incentives of the CEO option grants using the theoretical option vega. The option vega obtains a negative coefficient as expected but is not significant. When run together with our model's risk-taking incentive measure, our measure turns out to be significant with a negative coefficient. Hence, of the two risk-taking incentives, our bonus measure works better in this subsample. This indicates that in the empirical studies that analyze executives' incentives, it is not enough to use data on executive option plans; also bonuses are important. Adding leverage as a control does not increase the explanatory power significantly with this subsample of 51 banks but has the effect that none of the three variables is significant. This suggests that our results are somewhat sensitive to the sample choice, as leverage played a major role in our results with all the 86 banks sample. We also test our model with z-score (a proxy for overall bank risk, see e.g. Dam and Koetter (2012) ) and a subsample of 57 banks and find similar results as with the crisis returns with all the 86 banks. However, consistent with our theoretical model, in the z-score regression model CEO tenure has a significant negative sign, giving some indication that younger CEOs may have taken more risk.
In sum, our empirical setting is similar to that of Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) indicates that regulating directly the leverage would be more effective than regulating bankers' compensation.
The paper is organized as follows. After a literature review in Section 2, the model setup is presented in Section 3 and the value of the future bonus stream is derived in section 4. Section 5 presents the empirical results and Section 6 concludes.
Literature review
In this section we briefly review the literature on risk-taking incentives in corporations and banks especially, which are related to compensation, ownership, and the influence of the board. We then review a selection of recent papers which are more directly related to our work from two perspectives; banks' contractual risk-taking incentives in general and, specifically, the length of payment horizon in compensation contracts.
There are studies which find that the aggressiveness of managerial compensation does increase risk-taking in corporations (e.g. These papers are consistent with our theoretical model. 7 The reason to design such contracts is that managers are inherently too risk averse (cf. Beatty and Zajec (1994)) which may, however, depend on the amount and composition of their personal wealth (see Korkeamaki, Liljeblom, and Pasternack (2013) ). Interestingly, Houston and James (1995) did not find bankers' compensation to promote more risk-taking than in other industries. Further, Anderson and Fraser (2000) found that management's ownership in banks is positively related to bank risk-taking but that this relationship became negative (management ownership reduces bank risk-taking) in conjunction with regulatory changes in the US around 1990. Leaven and Levine (2009) and Pathan (2009) show that bank risk-taking may be determined at the level of a board which strongly represents shareholder interests.
The link between bankers' risk-taking incentives and the timing of their compensation is analyzed in several recent papers. The paper which provides most direct evidence that shorter-term compensation contracts increase risk-taking is by Gopalan, Milbourn, Song, and Thakor (2011). Using a carefully constructed measure of executive compensation duration for both financials and non-financials, they show that CEOs with shorter pay 7 However, empirically we find that bonus-based risk-taking incentives are not related to bank stock price performance during the global financial crisis; leverage is more important in explaining the crisis time bank stock returns. finds only little evidence that the pay structures provided incentives for risk-taking among top-level banking executives. In a theoretical paper, Gennaioli, Schleifer, and Vishny (2011) emphasize the role of neglected risks leading to the crisis. Our theoretical model predicts that compensation affects risk-taking in a nonlinear way but empirically, we find that banks' leverage is the most important variable in explaining the banks' stock returns during the crisis. Neither do we find evidence that compensation would explain increases in leverage (which is one form of increasing bank risk). Another reason for the different results from these studies may be, as discussed above, the different ways to measure compensation-based CEO risk-taking incentives.
More generally, our paper is also related to principal-agent models (see e.g. Grossman and Hart (1983), Holmstrom (1979 Holmstrom ( , 1982 Holmstrom ( , 1983 Holmstrom ( , 1999 ), Milgrom (1991, 1994) , Myerson (1982) , Rogerson (1985) , and Sannikov (2008) ). However, in the present paper, we do not use principal-agent modeling since we take the bankers' compensation as given and then model their risk-taking incentives. In our theoretical part, we focus on the effects of the duration of the convex pay components. There are two assets, a risk-free asset and a risky asset. The risky asset can be viewed as the bank's main business and the risk-free asset as a source of leverage. Thus, the bank debt is risk-free in our model and its dynamics is given by
where r is the risk-free rate and r > 0. When the bank borrows money from the market, it sells the bonds, i.e., the holding is negative and its borrowing cost is the risk-free rate.
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Under the risk-neutral probability measure Q (for more on risk-neutral pricing see e.g. Duffie (2001) ), the risky asset follows dS(t) = S(t)rdt + S(t)σdW (t), where S(0) > 0, σ is the volatility and it satisfies σ > 0, and W (t) is a standard Wiener process under Q. We denote by {F t } the information filtration generated by the Wiener process. Thus, F t is the information at time t.
The bank controls its asset holdings in continuous time in such a way that it keeps the fractions invested in the risk-free and risky assets constant. Since the bank use leverage, it has a negative holding in the risk-free asset. Then it invests all its equity and debt into the risky asset that can be viewed as its loan portfolio. Therefore, under the risk-neutral probability measure Q the bank's net portfolio value, i.e., its equity value evolves according to (see e.g. Merton (1971) 
where A(t) is the equity value and A(0) > 0, levered volatility σ θ = (1 + θ)σ, and θ is the bank debt relative to the equity value. Thus,
where n B (t) is the bond holding (negative) at time t. This gives n B (t) = −θA(t)/B(t),
i.e., the bank adjust its borrowing all the time to keep θ constant. For instance, when the equity A(t) falls then the bank borrows less.
We analyze how the levered volatility σ θ affects the compensation value. Note again that σ θ rises in θ and σ, i.e., the banker can increase risk by increasing the leverage and/or the risky asset volatility, and here we do not focus on the mechanism how the banker changes σ θ (but clearly there are two ways).
From (1) we get
where t 2 > t 1 .
For calculating the banker's compensation, tenure [0, T ] is divided into n equal length intervals, where n is bounded. That is, ∆ = T /n, where ∆ is the length of the intervals.
At the end of each interval, the bank pays a bonus to the banker and the bonus depends on the change of the net asset value during the time period. More specifically, at the end of i'th interval, the bonus payoff is given by
for all i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, where k ∈ (0, 1) and it represents the fraction of profits paid out as compensation to the banker, ∆ is the time interval between the time points and n∆ = T . Thus, at the end of each time interval the bank pays bonus to the banker if the net asset value has risen.
For example, if n = 1 then we have just one payoff and this happens at time T :
Value of the compensation
In this section we analyze how the bonus frequency affects the compensation value and the banker's risk-taking incentives. More specifically, we model the incentives given the asset dynamics (1) and the bonuses (3), and do not consider explicitly the banker's effort.
Let us define the following Black and Scholes (1973) call option price:
is standard normal density,
Thus, C(∆) is ∆-maturity European call option on
with strike price equal to one.
Our model can be extended to more complicated asset processes, such as a jump diffusion process for the assets (see e.g. Kou (2002) ), and then this would change the pricing of C(∆) and the rest of our analysis would be the same.
By the risk-neutral pricing and (3), the present value of the banker's compensation package is given by
Thus, the compensation package is a sequence of call option contracts. The number of contracts in the sequence depends on ∆. For instance, if ∆ = T then π 1 equals one call option with maturity date T . By (5) and iterated expectation, we get the following result.
Proposition 1
The value of the compensation package with n payout periods on [0, T ] is given by
where C is the call option price (4), k is the fraction of profits paid out as compensation, and A(0) is the initial net asset value.
Proof: By (5) and iterated expectation, we get
Thus, the value of the compensation equals nkA(0) many call options with maturity T /n. From Proposition 1 we get the following corollary.
. Then π n rises in n,
i.e., π n+1 ≥ π n .
Proof: By Boyle and Scott (2006), the constraint on r gives a sufficient condition for C(y) being increasing and concave in y for all y ∈ 0, T n . Let us set n = k and then, since π n is continuous in n, we have
where k ∈ {1, 2, ...}. The inequality holds because C(y) is concave for all y ∈ 0, T k and, thus, we have
Corollary 1 is a sufficient condition for C(∆) being increasing and concave for all
T n and this guarantees π n+1 ≥ π n . Even though it is possible to find parameter values, where C(∆) is locally convex in ∆, 11 we have not found a case, where the result (π n+1 ≥ π n ) does not hold since this would require convexity for a wide range of ∆ values.
Since the compensation value is a portfolio of call options, the value rises in the levered volatility σ θ . That is, ∂πn ∂σ θ > 0 and, by Proposition 1 and Black and Scholes (1973), we get the formula for the bonus vega:
where
is standard normal density. Now we can state the following corollary that gives how the vega changes with respect to n.
Corollary 2
The sensitivity of the compensation value with respect to levered volatility σ θ rises in the number of periods n:
Proof: Since r > 0, σ θ > 0, and ∆ > 0, we have
This gives
By Corollary 2, the shorter the time period ∆ = T /n is, the stronger the effect of the levered volatility. This implies that bankers with short term compensation packages have a high incentive to increase leverage and/or their business risk. This is consistent ) with respect to the number of compensation time periods.
Note that the higher the number, the shorter the compensation time interval ∆. As can be seen, both the compensation value and the vega are positive, concave, and increasing in the number of periods. Thus, by our model and the numerical example of Figure 1 , the higher the bonus payment frequency is, the higher the compensation value and the risk-taking incentives; however, their rates of increase fall in the number of periods. Figure 2 illustrates the compensation value and risk-taking incentives with respect to the levered volatility. As can be seen, both the compensation value and the vega are positive. The compensation value rises in the levered volatility, while the risk-taking incentive is low at very low volatility values but rises rapidly.
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5 Empirical analysis
Data and Variables
The aim of our empirical analysis is to calculate the theoretical CEO risk incentive measure, the model's vega (6) T , the remaining tenure of the CEO is estimated by taking the minimum of 10 years and the difference between the CEO's retirement age and current age. The retirement age is assumed to be common for all CEOs in the sample and is proxied by the highest CEO age observation in the data, which is 77 years. The cap of 10 years on the remaining CEO tenure is motivated by studies on average CEO tenures. 15 We test the robustness of our results with an alternative tenure cap of 20 years and get almost identical results as 12 Bankrupt, merged, and delisted banks are treated using the procedure in Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011). We also consider an alternative specification of the crisis return period; see below.
13 To double-check our data accuracy, we replicate the regression of Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) in which they regress the crisis returns on the CEO cash bonus per salary. We obtain corresponding results (unreported here but available upon request).
14 Our measure of return on assets, net income over the book value of total assets, is the same as used e.g. by Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011). reported in subsection 5.2 with the 10-year cap.
16 Finally, all equity market information and bank balance sheet data needed in the regression analysis come from Compustat and BankScope, respectively. For our main regression, we end up with a balanced sample of 86 banks out of the 96 original sample banks. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of the variables, and Table 2 gives their correlations. The variables with the highest correlations in absolute terms with the crisis return (including both variables directly related to our theoretical model as well as additional control variables) are the share of real estate lending over total loans (26%), the leverage (-24% which is slightly higher than the closely related variable, levered earnings volatility σ θ with -23% correlation), total assets (-22%), non-performing loans over total loans (22%), trading assets over total assets (-19%) , the market to book ratio (19%), and the vega which has a correlation of -17% with the crisis return. As it turns out that leverage and the market to book equity ratio are the two most important variables explaining crisis return in our regression models, Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the relationships between the crisis return, the vega, the leverage, and the market to book ratio.
Empirical results
The negative relationship between crisis return and the vega is driven by the five biggest vega observations; 17 most vegas (in case of 61 banks) are in actuality zero, meaning that these banks have not paid any CEO cash bonuses in 2006. Figure 3 shows that if we restrict attention to the 25 banks which paid positive bonuses in 2006, the correlation between the vega and the crisis return rises (in absolute terms) to -39%.
Other interesting correlations in the data are the following. The share of trading assets in total assets has a high correlation of 86% with bank size, measured by total assets (at the end of 2004 this correlation is even higher, 93%). Further, deposits over total assets have a correlation of -55% with bank size (total assets) and -60% with the share of trading assets. These two correlations are consistent with the common view that 16 The two versions of our model risk-incentive measure, the vega, with the 10-year CEO tenure cap and the 20-year cap, have a correlation of 98% (see Table 2 ). It is hence no surprise that the regression results in subsection 5.2 are essentially unaltered if we use the 20-year tenure cap assumption instead of the 10-year cap. We report only the results for the 10-year case.
17 The five banks with the highest vegas at the end of 2006, which stand out almost like outliers, are Bear Stearns, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, and Lehman Brothers.
the growth of trading activities before the crisis was mainly funded from the markets, not with deposits. The share of trading assets is also positively correlated with leverage (25%). Notably, our vega measure is quite strongly positively correlated with bank size (71%) and the share of trading assets (69%).
18 Accordingly, the vega is negatively correlated with the share of deposits over total assets. These correlations suggest that the bonus related risk-taking incentives, measured by the vega of our model, have been highest in banks focused on trading activities. Such banks are typically large and fund themselves less with deposits, and tend to have somewhat higher leverage. This is consistent with the fact that banks have two ways to raise risk -increase leverage and lower the asset quality -and, therefore, the levered earnings volatility (our risk measure) has high correlation with leverage (70%) and the share of trading assets (51%) that lowers the asset quality. Further, big banks seem to have higher incentive to increase their risks possibly due to deposit insurance and other government support mechanism (see e.g. Haldane (2009)). Table 3 reports six regression models. In regression (1) we find that our model risk- In regression (3) the vega is no longer significant when its four elements are added as control variables. An F -test confirms that regression (3) does not improve upon regression (2) . In regression (4) we add control variables that are outside our theory.
These variables are market to book equity ratio and bank leverage which both have a robust relationship with the crisis returns. Adding total assets as a proxy for bank size in regression (4) did not change the results. According to regression (4), banks with higher market to book ratios at the end of 2006 did relatively better during the crisis, and highly leveraged banks did relatively poorly. These finding are consistent with Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) . 19 Note that these two variables render all vega's elements individually insignificant, including σ θ , the role of which is apparently taken over by the leverage (the correlation between σ θ and leverage is 70%; see Table 2 ). Together market to book ratio and leverage explain about 17% of the crisis return variation in the sample, leverage being the more important driver. 20 However, the vega's elements jointly have a clear role as the R 2 of regression (4) is about 23%. Note that it is expected that leverage (in book values) and the market to book ratio (as a proxy for leverage in market terms) are related to crisis returns. By the basic balance sheet mechanism, going back to
Modigliani and Miller, a negative shock to a bank's assets value leads to a more negative equity return, the higher is the bank's leverage. In 2007-2008 the negative shock was a macro shock by nature, stemming from the US housing markets, and hence hit all the banks. Note that the market to book ratio may be positively related to the crisis return also because it may reflect a less risky bank asset portfolio and, hence, lower bank equity risk premium.
Since, by our theoretical model, increasing leverage is also a way of increasing risk (the other way is lowering asset quality), we further test whether our model risk-taking incentives in earlier years explained the banks' leverage increases. However, we find no evidence that the vega estimated at the end of 2004 explains banks' leverage change from 2004 to 2006, during the last two run-up years to the crisis (see Table 4 ). Instead we find that banks which increased their leverage had relatively low market to book ratios at the end of 2004. 21 In accordance with Acharya et al. (2013) , this suggests that banks closer to financial distress may have had incentives to continue further risk-taking. By our empirical results, if such risk-taking incentives existed, they were unrelated to CEO bonuses. Interestingly, we also find no evidence from a dummy variable for investment banks that these would have increased leverage more than others. Finally, we find no evidence that banks that continued to increase leverage until the crisis did worse than other banks (e.g. by Table 2 return is much stronger among the 25 banks which paid positive bonuses (see Figure 3 ).
Yet the relationship in this restricted sample is not robust in a regression (4, Table   3 ) type of setting with control variables (unreported here but available upon request).
The few banks with extremely large risk-taking incentives based on our model did have relatively poor stock performance during the crisis, but there were also plenty of banks who paid zero bonuses before the crisis and still did quite badly during the crisis.
With a subsample of 51 banks for which we found CEO option grants we also tested the risk-taking incentive effect of these option grants, using vegas based on the Black- 21 In Table 4 we report the effects of a number of other control variables one by one and find that also a relative high liquidity ratio at the end of 2004 positively explains leverage increase. 22 All banks had positive earnings in 2006 so the zero bonuses are not explained by that but rather appear to indicate that the zero-bonus banks did not have a bonus program for their CEOs.
Scholes model. The option vega obtains a negative coefficient as expected but is not significant. When run together, our bonus vega turns out to be significant with a negative coefficient (see Table 3 , regression (6)). Hence, of the two risk-taking incentives, the bonus vega works better in this subsample. This suggests that in the empirical studies that analyze executives' incentives, it is not enough to use data on executive option plans; also bonuses are important. Adding leverage as a control does not increase the explanatory power significantly but has the effect that none of the three variables is individually significant. This suggests that our results are somewhat sensitive to the sample choice, as leverage played a major role in the results with the entire 86 banks sample. In unreported regressions, we also tried adding a dummy variable for investment banks but this did not essentially change the results. Thus, the sample sensitivity is not related to investment banks as we have also controlled for them. Table 5 presents further robustness checks by adding to regression (4) of Table 3 additional control variables one by one. 23 In all these regressions we also control for the length (in years) of the CEO's tenure until the end of 2006. We also run the same regressions (including regression (4) of Table 3 Table 5 as well as in the unreported additional regression models the sample size drops significantly from those in Table 3 because the new control variables were not available for all the banks in Table 3 . We also tried quantile regressions for different quantiles of crisis returns but did not find any further robust effects. Overall, we find no further evidence for our vega measure from any of these regressions, nor any new control variables which would be significant. Perhaps due to the drop in sample sizes all previously significant variables (including leverage and market-to-book) largely lose their significance (see Table 5 ), although the levered earnings volatility partly captures the role of leverage (see e.g. regression (4)A.1). We also rerun corresponding regressions as in Table 3 has been widely used in the empirical literature as a proxy for overall bank risk (see e.g. Table   6 shows that the results are generally similar as in Table 3 but overall less significant.
Dam and Koetter (2012), Gropp et al. (2013), and Laeven and Levine (2009)).
The expected CEO tenure now appears with a significant negative sign, giving some indication that younger CEOs may have taken more risk, measured by the z-score.
In summary, even though we use a nonlinear risk-taking measure, our empirical results are not inconsistent with Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) who conclude that bonusbased CEO risk-taking incentives do not explain banks' crisis time stock performance.
The empirical predictors of the crisis time bank stock performance, for which we mainly find support are bank leverage (with a negative effect) and the market to book equity ratio (with a positive effect). Our empirical findings suggest that regulatory efforts to control bank leverage would be more effective in limiting banks' risks than regulating bonuses. 24 
Conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed the risk-taking incentives of a banker whose compensation contract involves a convex element in the form of cash bonuses. We have derived in a standard continuous-time asset pricing framework the present value of the future stream of the banker's bonuses. Two key results are obtained from the theoretical model. First, the present value of bonuses is the higher, the shorter is their payment interval. Second, the shorter the bonus payment interval, the higher is the banker's incentive to increase risk. ). CEO tenure (cap 10) is parameter T with 10 year tenure cap and vega(cap 10) is the corresponding model vega. , equation (6)). CEO tenure (cap 10) is parameter T with 10 year tenure cap and vega 2004 (cap 10) is the corresponding model vega. Different columns correspond to different regression models with different explanatory variable sets. White corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. 2004--2006 
where x i is a vector of the explanatory variables measured at the end of 2004. White corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
( , equation (6)). CEO tenure (cap 10) is parameter T with 10 year tenure cap and vega 2006 (cap 10) is the corresponding model vega. Different columns correspond to different regression models with different explanatory variable sets. Regression models (4)A.2 -(4)G have the same sample of banks. White corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. , equation (6)). CEO tenure (cap 10) is parameter T with 10 year tenure cap and vega 2006 (cap 10) is the corresponding model vega. Different columns correspond to different regression models with different explanatory variable sets. z-score = ( return on assets + capital asset ratio ) / asset volatility, where we estimate the asset volatility as the standard deviation of the return on assets over 10 quarters. White corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
